This paper presents a new model for multi-issue negotiation under time constraints in an incomplete information setting. In this model the order in which issues are bargained over and agreements are reached is determined endogenously as part of the bargaining equilibrium. We show that the sequential implementation of the equilibrium agreement gives a better outcome than a simultaneous implementation when agents have like, as well as conflicting, time preferences. We also show that the equilibrium solution possesses the properties of uniqueness and symmetry, although it is not always Pareto-optimal.
INTRODUCTION
Agent mediated negotiation has received considerable attention in the field of electronic commerce [14, 9, 7] . In many of the applications that are conceived in this domain it is important that the agents should not only bargain over the price of a product, but also take into account aspects like the delivery time, quality, payment methods, and other product specific properties. In such multi-issue negotiations, the agents should be able to negotiate outcomes that are mutually beneficial for both parties [11] . However the complexity of the bargaining problem increases rapidly as the number of issues increases. Given this increase in complexity, there is a need to develop software agents that can operate effectively in such circumstances. To this end, this paper reports on the development of a new model for multi-issue negotiation between two agents.
In such bilateral multi-issue negotiations, one approach is to bundle all the issues and discuss them simultaneously. This allows the players to exploit trade-offs among different issues, but requires complex computations to be performed [11] . The other approach -which is computationally simpler -is to negotiate the issues sequentially. Although issue-by-issue negotiation minimizes the complexity of the negotiation procedure, an important question that arises is the order in which the issues are bargained. This ordering is called the negotiation agenda. Moreover, one of the factors that determines the outcome of negotiation is this agenda [4] . To this end, there are two ways of incorporating agendas in the negotiation model. One is to fix the agenda exogenously as part of the negotiation procedure [4] . The other way, which is more flexible, is to allow the bargainers to decide which issue they will negotiate next during the process of negotiation. This is called an endogenous agenda [5] . Against this background, this paper presents a multi-issue negotiation model with an endogenous agenda.
To provide a setting for our negotiation model, we consider the case in which negotiation needs to be completed by a specified time (which may be different for the different parties). Apart from the agents' respective deadlines, the time at which agreement is reached can affect the agents in different ways. An agent can gain utility with time, and have the incentive to reach a late agreement (within the bounds of its deadline). In such a case it is said to be a strong (patient) player. The other possibility is that it can lose utility with time and have the incentive to reach an early agreement. It is then said to be a weak (impatient) player. As we will show, this disposition and the actual deadline itself strongly influence the negotiation outcome. Other parameters that affect the outcome include the agents'strategies, their utilities and their reservation limits. However, in most practical cases agents do not have complete information on all of these parameters. Thus in this work we focus on bilateral negotiation between agents with time constraints and incomplete information.
To this end, Fatima et al presented a single-issue model for negotiation between two agents under time constraints and in an incomplete information setting [3] . Within this context, they determined optimal strategies for agents but did not address the issue of the existence of equilibrium. Here we adopt this framework and prove that mutual strategic behavior of agents, where both use their respective optimal strategies, results in equilibrium. We then extend this framework for multi-issue negotiation between a buyer and a seller for the price of more than one good/service. Specifically, each agent has a deadline before which agreement must end on all the issues. However, the order in which issues are bargained over and agreements are reached is determined by the equilibrium strategies. These strategies optimize the time at which an issue is settled and are therefore appropriate for the sequential implemen-tation scheme. Moreover, we show that the sequential implementation of the equilibrium agreement results in an outcome that is no worse than the outcome for the simultaneous implementation, both when agents have like as well as conflicting time preferences. Finally, we study the properties of the equilibrium solution.
This work extends the state of the art by presenting a more realistic negotiation model that captures the following three aspects of many real life bargaining situations. Firstly, it is a model for negotiating multiple issues. Secondly, it takes the time constraints of bargainers into consideration. Thirdly it allows agents to have incomplete information about each other.
In section 2 we first give an overview of the single-issue negotiation model of [3] and then prove that the mutual strategic behavior of agents where both use their respective optimal strategies results in equilibrium. In section 3 we extend this model to allow multiissue negotiation and study the properties of the equilibrium solution. Section 4 discusses related work. Finally, related: Command not found. section 5 gives some conclusions.
SINGLE-ISSUE NEGOTIATION MODEL
In this section we first provide an overview of the single issue negotiation model and a brief description of the optimal strategies as determined in [3] . Due to lack of space, we describe the optimal strategy determination for one specific negotiation scenario. We then prove that the optimal strategy profiles form sequential equilibrium points.
The Negotiation Protocol
This is basically an alternating offers protocol. 
Counter-offer generation
Since both agents have a deadline, we assume that they use a time dependent tactic (e.g. linear (L), Boulware (B) or Conceder (C)) [2] for generating the offers. In these tactics, the predominant factor used to decide which value to offer next is time t. The tactics vary the value of price depending on the remaining negotiation time, modeled as the above defined constant T a . The initial offer is a point in the interval [P a min , P a max ]. The constant k a multiplied by the size of interval determines the price to be offered in the first proposal by agent a (as per [2] ). The offer made by agent a to agent b at time t (0 < t ≤ T a ) is modeled as a function φ a depending on time as follows: A wide range of time dependent functions can be defined by varying the way in which φ a (t) is computed (see [2] for more details). However, functions must ensure that 0 ≤ φ
That is, the offer will always be between the range [P a min , P a max ], at the beginning it will give the initial constant and when the deadline is reached it will offer the reservation value. Function φ a (t) is defined as follows:
These families of negotiation decision functions (NDF) represent an infinite number of possible tactics, one for each value of ψ. However, depending on the value of ψ, two extreme sets show clearly different patterns of behaviour.
1. Boulware [11] . For this tactic ψ < 1 and close to zero. The initial offer is maintained till time is almost exhausted, when the agent concedes up to its reservtion value.
2. Conceder [10] . For this tactic ψ is high. The agent goes to its reservation value very quickly and maintains the same offer till the deadline. Finally when ψ = 1 price is increased linearly. Figure 1 . As shown in the figure, agreement is reached at a price P s min + (price-surplus/2) and at a time close to T. Similarly when the NDF in both strategies is replaced with C, then agreement (O2) is reached at the same price but towards the beginning of negotiation.
Agents' information state
Each agent has a reservation limit, a deadline, a utility function and a strategy. The information state I a of an agent a is the information it has about the negotiation parameters. An agent's own parameters are known to it, but the information it has about the opponent is not complete. I b and I s are taken as: 
). Thus agents have uncertain information about each other's deadline and reservation price. However, the agents do not know their opponent's utility function or strategy.
Agents' utilities are defined with the following two von NeumannMorgenstern utility functions [6] that incorporate the affect of time discounting. 
t , where δ a t is the discounting factor. Thus when (δ a > 1) the agent is patient and gains utility with time and when (δ a < 1) the agent is impatient and loses utility with time. Note that the agents may have different discounting factors.
Agents are said to have similar time preferences if both gain on time or both lose on time. Otherwise they have conflicting time preferences. Each agent's information is its private information that is not known to the opponent.
Optimal strategies
We describe how optimal strategies are obtained for players that are von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximizers. Since utility is a function of price and time, these strategies optimize both. The discussion is from the perspective of the buyer (although the same analysis can be taken from the perspective of the seller). b believes that with probability γ b , s's deadline is T s l and with prob-
This gives rise to three relations between agent deadlines; (
. For each of the two possible realizations of b's discounting factor, these three relations can hold between agent deadlines. In other words, there are six possible scenarios (N1..N6) under which negotiation can take place. Due to lack of space we describe here how the optimal strategies are obtained for one specific scenario -N1, i.e, when b gains on time (i.e., ). This is because s quits if agreement is not reached by then.
From its beliefs, it is known to b that s's reservation price, deadline pair could be one of (P
). These strategies are depicted in Figure 2 . Out of these four possible strategies, the one that results in maximum expected utility (EU) is b's optimal strategy (note that b's optimal strategy does not depend on s's strategy). The EUs from these four strategies depend on α b and γ b . An agent's utility from price is independent of its utility from time, i.e, the buyer always prefers a low price to a high price, and for a given price it always prefers a late agreement to an early one. In order to simplify the process of finding the optimal strategy, we assume α b = 1, i.e., there is only one possible value, P Figure 2) . The EUs 1 from these strategies are:
where
Out of these two, the one that gives a higher utility is optimal. EU1 and EU2 depend on the value of γ b . So γ b is varied between 0 and 1 and EU1 and EU2 are computed for different values of γ b . A comparison of these two utilities shows that for a particular value
Thus γc is crucial in determining the optimal strategy. This computation gives the optimal time (T can be optimal. The optimal strategy is S b 1 or S b 3 depending on the 1 Utility from conflict to both agents is less than zero.
for all values of t 
and 
). This means that the optimal price is P s . In such a scenario, the optimal strategy for s is to start at some high price, make small concessions till its deadline is almost reached and then offer the reservation price P Figure 2) . b gets the entire price-surplus.
When both buyer and seller lose utility on time, the optimal strategy for them is to offer P s minh at the earliest opportunity. This can be done using a Conceder NDF that results in agreement at the same price P s minh but towards the beginning of negotiation. In the same way, optimal strategies are obtained for the remaining negotiation scenarios. These are summarised in Table 1 . A similar kind of analysis is made from the seller's perspective to obtain P b o and T b o in the six possible scenarios. In each of these scenarios, the agents' optimal strategies do not depend on their opponent's strategy. Again see [3] for details.
There are many scenarios in which negotiation can take place. These depend on the agents' attitude towards time and the relationship between their deadlines. As stated earlier in this section, there are six possible scenarios from the buyer's perspective, on the basis of which it selects its strategy. Similarly from the seller's perspective there are also six possible scenarios. But the negotiation Table 2 : Outcome of negotiation when both agents use their respective optimal strategies outcome depends on all possible ways in which interaction between b and s can take place. There can be six possible orderings on the agent deadlines:
For each of these orderings, the agents' attitudes towards time could be one of the following:
1. Both buyer and seller gain utility with time (Case 1).
Buyer gains and seller loses utility with time (Case 2).
3. Buyer loses and seller gains utility with time (Case 3).
Both buyer and seller lose utility with time (Case 4).
Thus in total there are 24 possible negotiation scenarios and the outcome of negotiation depends on the exact scenario. A summary of these is given in Table 2 . P Note that these are the outcomes that will result if the agents' beliefs about each other satisfy the following conditions for convergence of strategies.
The similarity between these results and those of Sandholm and Vulkan [15] on bargaining with deadlines is that, in both cases, the price-surplus always goes to the agent with the longer deadline. However, the difference is that in [15] the deadline affect overrides time discounting, whereas here the deadline affect does not override time discounting. This happens because in [15] the agents always make offers that lie within the zone of agreeement. In our model, agents initially make offers that lie outside this zone, and thereby delay the time of agreement. Thus when agents have conflicting time preferences, in our case, agreement is reached near the earlier deadline, but in [15] agreement is reached towards the beginning of negotiation.
The single issue negotiation model of [3] only determines optimal strategies for agents on the basis of available information and shows the resulting outcome. However such an outcome is only possible if this mutual strategic behavior of agents leads to equilibrium. In the following subsection we prove this by using the standard game theoretic solution concept of sequential equilibrium.
Equilibrium agreements
Since agents do not have information about their opponent's strategy or utility, negotiation can be considered as a game of incomplete information. A strategy profile and belief system pair is a sequential equilibrium of an extensive game if it is sequential rational and consistent [8] . A system of beliefs µ in an extensive form game is a specification of a probability x ∈ [0, 1] for each decision node x in such that È x∈Á µ(x) = 1 for all information sets Á. In other words, µ represents the agent's beliefs about the history of negotiation. The player's strategies satisfy sequential rationality if for each information set of each player a, a's strategy is a best response to the other player's strategies, given a's beliefs at that information set. The requirement for µ to be consistent with the strategy profile is as follows. Even at an infromation set that is not reached if all players adhere to their strategies, it is required that a player's belief be derived from some strategy profile using Bayes' rule. 
PROOF. This is a direct consequence of the above proof. As the optimal strategies for both agents are dominant strategies at each of their information sets, there does not exist any other equilibrium (neither a pure nor a mixed strategy) where an agent uses a strategy other than its optimal strategy.
In the same way, sequential equilibrium can be shown to exist when agents use their optimal strategies in all the remaining negotiation scenarios.
MULTI-ISSUE NEGOTIATION
We now extend the above model for multi-issue bargaining where the issues are independent 2 of each other. Assume that buyer, b, and seller, s, that have unequal deadlines, bargain over the price of two distinct goods/services, X and Y. Negotiation on all the issues must end before the deadline. We consider two goods/services in order to simplify the discussion but this is a general framework that works for more than two goods/services.
Agents' information state
Let the buyer's reservation prices for X and Y be P 
Independence is a common and reasonable assumption to make in this context. Future work will deal with the dependent case.
where 
An agent's information state is its private knowledge. The agents' utility functions are defined as:
Note that the discounting factors are different for different issues. This allows agents' attitudes toward time to be different for different issues.
Negotiation protocol
Again we use an alternating offers negotiation protocol. There are two types of offers. An offer on just one good is referred to as a single offer and an offer on two goods is referred to as a combined offer. One of the agents starts by making a combined offer. The other agent can accept/reject part of the offer (single issue) or the complete offer. If it rejects the complete offer, then it sends a combined counter-offer. This process of making combined offers continues till agreement is reached on one of the issues. Thereafter agents make offers only on the remaining issue (i.e., once agreement is reached on an issue, it cannot be renegotiated). Negotiation ends when agreement is reached on both the issues or a deadline is reached. Thus the action A that agent s takes at time t on a single offer is as defined in section 2.1 . Its action on a combined offer, A s (t , X
Implementation schemes
Any two strategies (S b , S s ) lead to an outcome of the game. If S b and S s are the equilibrium strategies, then the outcome is an agreement on X at time t and price px and an agreement on Y at time τ and price py. Payoffs for this outcome depend on the rules by which agreements are implemented.
• Sequential implementation. Exchange of a given good/service takes place at the time of agreement on a price for that good/service. The agents' utilities from the strategy pair (S b , S s ) leading to agreements (px, t) and (py, τ ) are:
• Simultaneous implementation. Exchange of goods/services takes place only after agreement is reached on prices of all the goods. The agents'utilities for this rule are:
Since the equilibrium strategies optimize the time (and price) of agreement on an issue, it seems obvious that the agents will be better off if exchange takes place sequentially rather than simultaneously. However, since agents can have like, as well as, conflicting time preferences, it is important to determine if sequential implementation proves better than simultaneous implementation for both agents under all negotiation scenarios. We show below that sequential implementation of the equilibrium agreement always gives a better outcome than simultaneous implementation. 
The utility from X is greater for sequential implementation since T < τ and both agents lose on time. The utility from Y is equal for both schemes. As a result, sequential implementation gives a total utility that is higher than simultaneous implementation. The utility that the seller gets is:
As s also loses on time on X, its utility from X is higher for sequential implementation giving a higher cumulative utility than simultaneous implementation.
Thus sequential implementation always gives a better outcome than simultaneous implementation.
The same argument holds good when b and s negotiate over more than two issues. Thus from the perspective of both agents, sequential implementation proves to be a better implementation scheme than simultaneous implementation.
Properties of the equilibrium solution
The main focus in the design of a negotiation model is on the properties of the outcome, since the choice of a model depends on the attributes of the solution it generates. We therefore study some important properties [8] of the equilibrium agreement. In all the remanining scenarios it can be seen that the solution is Pareto-efficient; an increase in one agent's uitlity lowers its opponent's utility.
RELATED WORK
Fershtman [4] extends Rubinstein's complete information model [12] for splitting a single pie to multiple pies. This model imposes an agenda exogenously, and studies the relation between the agenda and the outcome of the bargaining game. It is based on the assumption that both players have identical discounting factors and does not consider agent deadlines. Similar work in a complete information setting includes [5] but it makes the agenda endogenous.
Bac and Raff [1] developed a model that has an endogenous agenda. They extend Rubinstein's model [13] for single pie bargaining with incomplete information by adding a second pie. In this model the price-surplus is known to both agents. For both agents, the discounting factor is assumed to be equal over all the issues. One of the players knows its own discounting factor and that of its opponent. The other player knows its own discounting factor but is uncertain of the opponent's discounting factor. This can take one of two values, δH with probability Π and δL with probability 1 − Π. These probabilities are common knowledge. Thus agents have asymmetric information about discounting factors. However they do not associate deadlines with players.
The difference between these models and ours is that firstly, our model considers both agent deadlines and discounting factors. Secondly, in our case the players are uncertain about the opponent's reservation price and deadline. Each agent knows its own reservation price and deadline but has a binary probability distribution over its opponent's reservation price and deadline. Moreover, the discounting factor is different for different issues and the players have no information about the opponent's discounting factors. Thirdly, each agent's information state is its private knowledge which is not known to its opponent. Our model is therefore closer to most real life bargaining situations than the other models. The fourth point of difference lies in the attributes of the solution. Comparing the solution properties of these models, we see that the existing models do not have a unique equilibrium solution. The equilibrium solution depends on the identity of the first player. In our model, the equilibrium solution is unique and is independent of the identity of the first player. However, as is the case with our model, the equilibrium solution is not always Pareto-optimal in the other models.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented a model for multi-issue negotiation under time constraints in an incomplete information setting. The order in which issues are bargained over and agreements are reached is determined endogenously, as part of the bargaining equilibrium rather than imposed exogenously, as part of the game tree. An important property of this model is the existence of a unique equilibrium. For any issue, this equilibrium results in agreement at the earlier deadline if at least one agent has the incentive to reach a late agreement and at the beginning of negotiation if both agents have the incentive to reach an early agreement. The price-surplus on all issues goes to the agent with the longer deadline.
The sequential implementation of the equilibrium agreement was shown to result in an outcome that is no worse than the outcome for simultaneous implementation when agents have similar, as well as conflicting, time preferences. The equilibrium agreement possesses the properties of being unique and symmetric, although it is not always Pareto-optimal.
As it currently stands, our model considered the negotiation issues to be independent of each other. In future we intend to study bargaining over interdependent issues. Apart from this, our model considered the case where agents had uncertain information about each other's deadline and reservation price. In future we will introduce learning into the model that will allow the agents to learn these parameters during negotiation. These extensions will take the model further towards real life bargaining situations.
